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Goldstein: Enforcement of Drug Abuse Laws

Judicial Dilemmas in Enforcement of Drug Abuse Laws
by Alvin H. Goldstein, Jr. *

In Maryland, last October, a 23-year-old university student
was sentenced to six months in prison for illegal possession
of amphetamines, drugs which could have been legally prescribed. At about the same time, in the State of Washington,
a defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison for selling
one marijuana cigarette to a 16-year-old boy. A 28-yearold University of Wisconsin student was given a two-year
suspended state prison sentence for possession of marijuana
and placed on supervised probation on condition that he
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spend his nights for a full year in the state reformatory, pay
all court and attorneys' costs, and submit to psychiatric examination and treatment. In Ohio, a defendant was sentenced
to 20 to 40 years in state prison for selling poinsettia on the
representation that it was marijuana. 1 In California, over
40 percent of those convicted of marijuana possession in 1967
served jail, CYA, or prison terms, and most were under the
age of 25. 2
It is a matter of public concern that drug laws, including
those related to use of alcohol, are unevenly and in some cases
arbitrarily enforced. Equal justice under law is hard to
demonstrate.
There are two categories of offenders. Both are reached
by our drug laws and each creates a judicial dilemma of differing dimensions. One is the addict who is prosecuted for
disease-compelled conduct; the other is the non-addict user
who commits a volitional act in defiance of law.
In the Maryland case it is reported that the defendant
was one of seven users jailed that day as a public example of what would happen to persons caught in possession of
drugs, reflecting the court's expectation that its sentence would
deter drug use among others similarly situated and inclined. 3
However, deterrent effect in this field is virtually impossible
to prove, and such harsh sentences are better explained as
intentionally retributive. Mr. Justice Douglas reminds us that
a prescription for insanity in sixteenth-century England was
to beat the afflicted person until he regained his reason. In
America, the violently insane were often sent to prison or to
whipping posts, or were hanged or burned at the stake. The
pauper insane were left to roam the countryside to be casually
pilloried, whipped, and jailed. 4 Harsh prison sentences that
neither rehabilitate nor deter are similarly motivated.
1. As reported in the New Republic,
Nov. 30, 1968, p. 11.
2. Drug Arrest Dispositions in California (1967), Bureau of Criminal
Statistics, Department of Justice, State
of California. Drug arrests in Calif.,
1968 Midyear Preliminary Survey,
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CA L LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/23

Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Department of Justice, State of California.

3. New Republic, Nov. 30, 1968,
p. 11.

4. See Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 82 S.Ct. 1417
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Theoretically, tough drug control laws were enacted to
get at those who traffic in drugs-the wholesalers and the
sellers-and to protect those who would use drugs for other
than medical reasons from being caught up in the quicksand
of drug use. As a practical matter, drug laws are enforced
against young, emotionally unstable, non-criminal types; the
very persons we set out to protect. It is not that the police
are reluctant to arrest the sellers. Sellers are difficult to
apprehend, require extensive and often expensive investigation,
and are not as obvious as drug users.
Stanford University Law Professor Herbert Packer has classified drug possession as a "victimless crime" and points out
that this kind of offense poses more of an investigative challenge to the authorities than the crime with a known victim.
Unlike murder, robbery, or burglary where the corpus delicti
is usually self-evident, the narcotic investigator not only must
apprehend the criminal but must first uncover the crime. For
that reason, the defense of entrapment is often asserted in
drug cases and even a superficial reading of the advance
sheets discloses that most current search and seizure problems
arise out of drug prosecutions. The victimless nature of the
offense compels a ferreting out of the offender and requires
unique-sometimes questionable-investigatory techniques.
As Professor Packer explains, "If suspects may be entrapped
into committing offenses, if the police may arrest and search a
suspect without evidence that he has committed an offense, if
wiretaps and other forms of electronic surveillance are permitted, it becomes easier to detect the commission of offenses
of this sort.,,5 Thus, the investigatory process in drug cases
frequently gives rise to constitutional questions and places
an additional strain on the system.
Traditionally, local law enforcement has had to concentrate
on addicts and users while leaving the worst offenders to federal agencies such as the Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau
of Customs, which do a woefully inadequate job of controlling
the importation of illicit drugs and narcotics. By and large,
(1962), concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas.
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5. Packer, Limits of the Criminal
Sanction, Stanford University Press, pp.
151-152 (1969).
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the community protects drug users by punishing them, thereby
demonstrating society's failure and the futility of the present
system. In their chronicle of the common law, Pollock and
Maitland wrote that, "[I]t is hard for us to acquit ancient law
of that unreasoning instinct that impels a civilized man to
kick or consign to eternal perdition the chair over which he
has stumbled."a In the field of drug abuse (and others) modern
law is performing similarly.
Our society contrives to deceive itself. Burdened and conscience-stricken with known techniques for reducing crime,
poverty, and disease, we find the cost of reform too great and
dissemble by creating forms without substance. Humanity
requires reform, but the community will settle for less. Moreover, the average individual is incapable of the empathy,
compassion, and sustained interest required to galvanize our
leaders into the kind of action needed to create a truly civilized community. The "great society" would have been great
if only its members had been willing to make it so.
We are encumbered by hypocritical institutions and procedures that restrict the courts' ability to control criminal
offenders: mental hospitals lacking in the personnel or equipment to effectively treat patients, that become little more than
places of confinement; a so-called hospital for the criminal
insane that offers little by way of psychiatric care, sometimes
less than that afforded by a prison; prisons that provide slim
hope of rehabilitation, except through their deterrent effect, a
form of aversive therapy which infrequently works; and probation departments that lack the personnel to carry out their
assignments; yet, judges regularly place people on probation,
knowing full well that they will not be effectively supervised.
Society's management of the drug problem is no exception
and there is much to be said for relieving law enforcement
and the criminal law from at least some of the responsibility
for drug control and taking a truly multi-discipline approach.
One of the paradoxical aspects of the present system is that
6. Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law, Cambridge University
Press (1909), Vol. II, pp. 474-475.
634
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by creating an illicit market, profits are assured for those
who are willing to risk arrest and prosecution. However, it
must be conceded that so long as the criminal law carries the
major responsibility for drug control, the punitive cannot be
overlooked as an appropriate method for discouraging the voluntary use of drugs. It is not enough to say glibly that we
punish those we try to protect. What else are we going to do,
short of legalizing drugs, if individuals insist upon purchasing
and using illicit drugs and are not themselves addicted?
Given the physical facilities, the addict can be committed.
But what about the scofflaw? Most of our recent experience
with this category of offender involves the use of marijuana.
We are all too familiar with arguments that are made respecting the relative dangers of alcohol and tobacco and the suggestion that, compared to alcohol, marijuana is a relatively
mild intoxicant that does less organic damage than alcohol.
Researchers at Boston University recently arrived at this conclusion while at the same time pointing out that marijuana
is not as harmless as its proponents claim, and that one can
get intoxicated on the drug. 7 A London psychiatrist who has
been conducting research on marijuana concludes that marijuana is even more dangerous than the recent Wooten Report
would imply and that those who use the drug on a regular
basis become society's dropouts. s
Assuming, however, the non-addictive character of marijuana, it is readily seen that where this drug is concerned the
law is not punishing for conduct incidental to addiction but
rather for conscious, volitional disregard of law. Although
some might question the wisdom of a law which bans marijuana
and the propriety of some of the penalties imposed for mere
possession, it is difficult to respect those who, though not acting under any compulsion, choose to violate the law.
7. Reported in Newsweek, Dec. 23,
1968, p. 48. Discussed in greater detail
in footnote infra p. 653, and in Volume
162 of Science Magazine, pp. 12341242.
8. Examiner-London Daily Express
Report, San Francisco Examiner, Feb.

3, 1969. The Wooten Report concluded that marijuana is a dangerous
drug that alters mood, judgment and
functional ability; a good argument, in
itself, for keeping regular users of the
drug off the highway.
CAL LAW 1969
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Punishment of Disease-Compelled Behavior

Addictive drugs, however, unlike marijuana, generate more
complex questions. The punishment of addicted persons for
conduct flowing from their disease has constitutional implications which have been debated in the courts for the past several
years. The debate is instructive in that it attempts to define
areas in which law enforcement has a legitimate concern and
yet should not be overly punitive in its control of the individual.
There is a Japanese proverb: "First the man takes a drink,
then the drink takes a drink, then the drink takes the man."9
It is when the drink has taken the man that the judicial
dilemma is greatest because we know then that whatever the
conduct, it is a product of the defendant's addiction.
Despite the talk about marijuana, methadrine, and LSD, by
far the most troublesome of drugs-insofar as the administration of justice is concerned-is alcohol. The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice reported that of two million arrests in 1965, one of
every three was for public drunkenness. 1o Recently compiled
statistics in Marin County indicate that, although marijuana
prosecutions have increased, alcohol offenses l l continue to account for one-third of misdemeanor and felony filings. This
does not include other more serious offenses in which the use
of alcohol has been a major factor, or disorderly conduct or
liquor law violations. While the legal debate has focused on
the "disease concept" of alcoholism, any drug could be substituted since the discussion concerns the general problem
of addiction.
The broad scope of the judicial dilemma is disclosed by
two United States Supreme Court cases: Robinson v. California/ 2 decided in 1962, and Powell v. Texas/ 3 decided
in 1968. In Robinson, the court struck down a California
9. Quoted in Kirbens, Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A. Journal 877, Sept.,
1968. (Sill, An Adage from the Orient,
1883.)
10. Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society (1967) p. 233.
636
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11. Cal. Penal Code § 647(f), public
drunkenness, and Cal. Vehicle Code
§ 23102, drunk driving.
12. 370 U.S. 660, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 82
S.Ct. 1417 (1962).
13. 392 U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254,
88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968).
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offense for a person "to
be addicted to the use of narcotics." The high court was
careful to decide the case on the very narrow ground that
the statute punished the status of narcotic addiction, rather
than the conduct which flows therefrom. Robinson, nonetheless, represents a clear and unequivocal holding that it is
a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment-and therefore unconstitutional
-to attempt to penalize a disease status such as drug addiction. If this is true, what of conduct compelled by addiction,
such as possession of heroin by a heroin addict? If he cannot
be punished for being an addict, why should he be penalized
for compelled conduct over which he has no control?
A barrel of worms had been opened. Six years later, in
Powell, the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation
in which the statute went beyond the punishment of the status
of addiction, but reached conduct as well, i.e., public drunkenness. In 1956, the American Medical Association had proclaimed that "[a]lcoholism must be regarded as within the
purview of medical practice."14 When Powell was argued
before the Supreme Court in 1967, the American Medical
Association was amicus curiae supporting the disease concept
of alcoholism and taking the position that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Bill of Rights renders it unconstitutional to punish anyone for conduct which is compelled
by and incident to a disease. The position of appellant
Powell and of the American Medical Association, was that
although conduct is involved, it is an inevitable consequence
of a disease status and therefore an involuntary act which
should not be penalized by the criminal law. Although this
position appears to flow logically from the Supreme Court's
holding in Robinson, that disease itself cannot be punished,
crucial policy questions arise. For example, what about the
arsonist whose setting of fires results from pyromania, the
mentally disordered sex offender whose molestation of children
is an inevitable consequence of a diseased mind, or the mur14. 162 J.A.M.A. 749, 750. October
20, 1956.
CAL LAW 1969
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derer whose homicidal act is compelled by a form of paranoia,
not reached by the defense of insanity? The practical problem
in Powell is less dramatic because the court is confronted
with a typically petty offense involving alcoholics, i.e., public
intoxication. Yet, to accept as a constitutional principle the
proposition that no person can be punished for conduct directly
related to or compelled by disease establishes a legal doctrine
that must be extended beyond alcoholism to disease and conduct of all kinds.
In Robinson, Mr. Justice Stewart discusses the relationship
of crime to disease in terms that make Powell's position all the
more compelling:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person
to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease. A State might determine that the
general health and welfare require that the victims of
these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or
sequestration. But, in the light of contemporary human
knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such
a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . We
cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same
category . . . To be sure, imprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a
common cold. 15

But what is a disease? The late E. M. Jellinek wrote that:
"A disease is what the medical profession recognizes as such.
The fact that they are not able to explain the nature of a
condition does not constitute proof that it is not an illness.
15. 370 u.s. at 667, 8 L.Ed.2d at
763, 82 S.Ct. at 1420.
638
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The nature of some [diseases] is still unknown, but they
are nevertheless unquestionable medical problems. "16
Insofar as the law is concerned, a difficult conceptual
problem is created because of the volitional aspect of this
particular disease. Unlike the common cold where contact
with virus is chance, there is an element of choice in
alcoholism. Dr. David J. Myerson, a Harvard psychiatrist
and Director of the Drug Addiction Center at Boston State
Hospital asserts that, "If you really went on a medical basis,
you know that a person doesn't choose to have a heart disease,
but there is a whole series of voluntary actions in the act of
drinking; and there has to be a choice involved, or else I cannot think of these people as human beings. In this way,
philosophically speaking, alcoholism is not a disease, although
. . . it has by custom been called mental illness.,,17
For centuries culpability has been based upon the maxim:
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make
the doer of it guilty, unless the mind be guilty; that is, unless
the intention be criminal). Under California law, we have
codified this principle to require a union of act and intent
and both must concur to constitute the crime. IS General
criminal intent simply means an intent to commit the act which
the law declares to be a crime. California expressly exempts
from criminal liability those who commit an act "without being
conscious thereof,,,19 but also provides that "no act committed
by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less
criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose,
motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into
consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the
time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which
he committed the act.,,20
16. Jellinek, The Disease Concept of
Alcoholism (1960) pp. 12, 55-59, 8386, 113-115, 165.
17. Quoted in Kirbens, Chronic
Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Re-

sponsibility, 54 A.B.A. Journal 877,
Sept., 1968.
18. Cal. Penal Code § 20.
19. Cal. Penal Code § 26(Five).
20. Cal. Penal Code § 22.
CAL LAW 1969
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The present debate, therefore, is not over the person who,
though not acting under any compulsion, permits himself to
become high on drugs and then commits a criminal act, but
rather over the person who because of addiction cannot avoid
taking a drink, a pill, or a shot. Should that person be held
criminally responsible for his compelled conduct, whatever it
might be, or should the state be restricted to civil commitment
proceedings?
Before Powell reached the Supreme Court, two United
States Courts of Appeal, the Fourth and District of Columbia
Circuits, tackled the problem of addiction-related conduct
in cases involving alcoholism. 1 Both courts proceed on the
premise that "chronic alcoholism" is a disease and presume
that Robinson stands for the proposition that conduct compelled by alcoholism cannot be punished. These cases, both
decided in 1966, address themselves to the chronic or involuntary drinker. The National Council on Alcoholism defines a
"chronic alcoholic" as a "person who is powerless to stop
drinking."2 In Driver v. Hinnant, the Fourth Circuit held that
"the alcoholic's presence in public is not his act, for he did not
will it. It may be likened to the movements of an imbecile or
a person in a delirium of a fever."s In Easter v. District of
Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that "one who is a chronic
alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary to be held
responsible criminally for being drunk in public.,,4 In the
wake of these opinions by two influential appellate courts, the
American Medical Association editorially urged its members
to accept the responsibility implied by the decisions and respond to the challenge by insisting upon treatment of the
alcoholic in a medical setting. 5 The judges of both courts
of appeal clearly invited the United States Supreme Court to
do likewise.
1. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761
(4th Cir. [1966]); Easter v. District of
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 124 App. D.C.
33 (D.C. Cir. [1966]).

2. U.S. Public Health Service, Public. #730, Alcoholism, 1965.
3. 356 F.2d at 764.
640
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4. 361 F.2d at 53.
(Note that
Driver talks in terms of automatic or
unconscious conduct while Easter
focuses upon an absence of criminal intent, though both are based on involitional behavior.)
5. Editorial, 197 J.A.M.A. 582
(July-September 1966).
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Meanwhile,
Robinson,

most state courts adhered to
traditional concepts. The Michigan Supreme Court, in People
v. Hoy,6 provides an insight into the kind of reasoning which
permeates the present punitive approach to addict related conduct. Under Michigan law, a person who is charged and
convicted of a third offense of public drunkenness is guilty of
a high misdemeanor and may be sentenced to state prison.
Hoy had been convicted of being drunk in public as a third
offender and was sentenced to one and one-half to two years in
state prison. In actuality; Hoy had been arrested over twenty
times on drunk charges but until this experience had not been
charged as a third offender. Thus, his previous incarcerations
were for relatively short periods of time. Hoy's conviction
was challenged on the ground that it violated the Eighth
Amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment to
send a public drunk to the state prison. In denying the appeal
and upholding the conviction, the court acknowledged that the
American Medical Association had proclaimed alcoholism a
disease and that the State of Michigan in the context of public
health had done likewise. But, says the court:
it does not follow that the law may not punish a man
for having a disease. For the law punishes that which
is harmful to society, and medicine treats that which is
injurious to an individual's health. Thus, medical science
may develop a body of information or knowledge on the
subject of theft or murder or rape and doctors may coin
words which describe murderers, or rapists, or thieves
and proclaim their conditions to be diseases. The law
will regard such definitions as useful only in the frame
of reference of the healing arts . . . . The law does
not permit persons by their voluntary acts to place
themselves outside the purview of criminal responsibility.
In such a case, where drunkenness is the proximate condition of the offender, the deterrent force of the criminal
law operates to prevent the man from getting drunk in the
first place. 7
6. 380 Mich. 597, 158 N.W.2d 436
(1968).
41
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439-440. Cf. State v. Fearon (Minn.
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The court asserts that it is not the goal of the criminal
law to cure alcoholism, but rather to cure the public drunk
of his proclivity to be drunk and disorderly in a public place.
To that extent the Hoy opinion suggests that the law has a
deterrent effect and that a large percentage of those convicted of first and second offenses never commit a third offense. Of those who ultimately reach the state prison for
a third offense, the court claims that "after serving minimum
terms of one and one-half years less good time, they were returned to society as part of a category of parolees who have enjoyed a 76.7 percent ratio of successful rehabilitation." Taking
a crack at soft-hearted judges, the opinion suggests that one
reason for the failure to reduce public alcoholism with a resulting large number of arrests is the "reluctance of the law
to use the full measure of its time-tested antidotes."s
A concurring judge points out that a number of diseases
in addition to alcoholism have been declared to be criminal
offenses because of the compulsive conduct which is incident
thereto. He cites as examples: narcotics addiction leading
to illegal possession, pyromania which produces arson, homosexuality or other sex aberrations resulting in unlawful sexual
conduct and states that despite the disease orientation, society
has through the legislatures decreed that a person convicted of
such act shall be confined in a penal institution. Conceding
that there may be more appropriate or humane techniques
for controlling such behavior, this judge could find no constitutional infirmity in the punishment legislatively decreed.
A further concurrence was on the ground that the defendant's
intoxication in a public place resulted from his voluntary exercise of free choice, implying that if it were an involuntary and
compUlsive incident of the disease of alcoholism, punishment

S.C., March 21, 1969) unanimously
holding that a chronic alcoholic's conviction of voluntary drunkenness could
not be sustained because his diseasecompelled drinking was involuntary.
(5 Cr. L. Rptr. 2001; decided after this
article was prepared.)
8. "Time-tested antidotes" presumably means confinement in a prison set642
CAL LAW 1969
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ting. Life sentences or capital punishment would, of course, offer a more
impressive "ratio of successful rehabilitation." The court does not indicate
how many of the 76.7 percent have left
the State of Michigan, their problem
intact, to feed their addiction in less
harsh jurisdictions.
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would be unconstitutional because of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
It is in this framework that the United States Supreme Court
decided Powell. The trial court had expressly found that
Powell was a chronic alcoholic and that his appearance in
public was not of his own volition. The court nonetheless
held that "chronic alcoholism," however involuntary, is not
a defense, and the defendant was convicted. Thus, the key
issue was placed squarely before the Supreme Court: Is prosecution of an addict for conduct over which he has no control
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution? The Court
said No!
In a 5-4 decision, the high court affirmed Powell's conviction. All five Justices in the majority (Marshall, Warren,
White, Black, and Harlan) agreed that there was not enough
evidence before the lower Court to support its findings
that Powell was a chronic alcoholic or that chronic alcoholics
are unable to control their consumption of alcohol or to refrain from appearing in pUblic. Unlike Robinson, Powell
was not being punished for the status of addiction but rather
for conduct-i.e., drunk in pUblic.
One of the five Justices (White) suggests that he might have
voted with the dissent (Fortas, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart)
thereby making it the majority, if there had been evidence
in the trial record to support the state court's findings. He
agrees with the dissent that Robinson places mere use of
drugs by an addict beyond the reach of the criminal law
and implies that conduct may also be exempt if compelled
by the addiction. "The chronic alcoholic with an irresistible
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk."g He can, however, be convicted and
punished for being in public while drunk unless it can be
shown that it was impossible both to resist drunkenness and
to avoid public places when intoxicated. Since the Powell
record did not demonstrate this, Justice White felt that such
9. 392 u.s. at 547, 20 L.Ed.2d at
1276, 88 S.Ct. at 2162.
CAL LAW 1969
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a conclusion is "contrary to common sense and to common
knowledge."lo
A poor record and absence of substitutes for the county
jail would appear to explain the result of Powell. ll Nevertheless, we may be on the threshhold of a new era in the determination of criminal responsibility, based upon the frank
recognition that neither disease nor conduct produced and
made inevitable by disease should be punished by the criminal
law. This is wholly in accord with conventional common-law
principles exempting a person from criminal responsibility for
his involuntary or unconscious acts. Since intoxication has
always been considered voluntary in the legal sense, it has
never constituted a defense. The disease concept of alcoholism
and the medical classification of a chronic alcoholic would
permit a defendant to be found not guilty if he could establish
that he was a chronic alcoholic, unable to keep from taking
the first drink and, therefore, that his intoxication was involuntary. Under such circumstances, he would lack the mens
rea essential to the commission of any crime. By this analysis
we would not have to look to the Constitution and talk in
terms of "cruel and unusual punishment" to absolve an addict
from criminal responsibility compelled by his addiction. [See,
for example People v. Fearon, fn. 7, p. 641, supra.]
Moreover, in any jurisdiction which adopted the Durham 12
or "product rule" as an appropriate test for the defense of
insanity, it could be argued that the defendant's conduct was
a product of a mental disease and, therefore, that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. In this connection,
it is interesting to note that in the District of Columbia Circuit
which applies the "product rule," the court avoided holding
that alcoholism was a mental disease or defect, and instead
10. 392 U.S. at 549, 20 L.Ed.2d at
1277, 88 S.C!. at 2162.
11. "The optimistic conclusion is
that the legal profession stands ready
to herald 'a due process concept of
criminal responsibility' when the medical profession has evidenced 'the disease concept of alcoholism.' Leroy
644
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Powell was not the right defendant and
1968 was not the right year." Kirbens,
Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A. Journal
at 877, prefatory comment.
12. Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862, 94 App. D.C. 228, 45 A.L.R.
2d 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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ruled that ".
the defense of chronic alcoholism to a
charge of public intoxication is not rested upon mental disease
as relieving of criminal responsibility, but upon the absence
of responsibility incident to the nature of this particular ill,,13
ness. .
The reason for this fine distinction is probably a practical
one since every D.C. alcoholic found "not guilty by reason
of insanity" would be committed for an indeterminate period
to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, thus further over-burdening an
already overcrowded facility.
Lacking adequate facilities, we are left with the county
jail which, as the Supreme Court points out in Powell, at
least offers the possibility of sobering up, a shower, and a
hot meal. This reason alone probably has as much to do
with the result of Powell as all other reasons combined.
Summed up, it spells lack of facilities. Justice Marshall
reminds us that:
The medical profession as a whole, and psychiatrists in
particular, have been severely criticized for the prevailing
reluctance to undertake the treatment of drinking problems. Thus it is entirely possible that, even were the
manpower and facilities available for a full-scale attack
upon chronic alcoholism, we would find ourselves unable
to help the vast bulk of our "visible"-let alone our "invisible"-alcoholic population.
[T]he medical
profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any assurance that, even if the buildings, equipment and trained
personnel were made available, it could provide anything more than slightly higher-class jails for our indigent habitual inebriates. Thus we run the grave risk
that nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging
of a new sign-reading "hospital"-over one wing of
the jailhouse. 14

The handwriting is on the wall. Unless the community
is willing to spend the money required to provide humane
13. Easter v. District of Columbia,
361 F.2d 50, 124 App. D.C. 33 (D.C.
Cir. [1966]).

14. Powell v Texas, 392 U.S. at 528,
20 L.Ed.2d at 1265, 88 S.Ct. at 2152.
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

645

15

Drug Abuse
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 23

treatment for drug addicted persons and to cease relying upon
the criminal law to correct all of society's ills, the Supreme
Court will force the legislative issue by declaring present laws,
as applied to addicts and their conduct, unconstitutional. As
the Director of the American Bar Foundation Project on
Mental Illness and the Criminal Law asserts:
Judicial determination that processing of alcoholics by
the criminal law must end will not be a panacea. The
alternative, however, is to continue the present systemwhich all observers agree is futile. To achieve official
recognition that the criminal process has failed in the
case of alcoholism is no mean victory in a country whose
favorite solution for social evils has often been the
simple expedient of passing a criminal statute. However,
until society marshals the medical facilities consistent
with the implications of this recognition, it will be only
a Pyrrhic victory.15

Efforts to meet the implications of Robinson and Powell
have not been lacking. A bill has been introduced in the
California legislature which would preclude the use of criminal processes for chronic alcoholics charged with public
drunkenness. The bill requires each county to provide emergency medical, detoxification services and diagnostic facilities,
including inpatient extended care facilities, outpatient after
care facilities, supportive residential facilities, and vocational
and family counseling services. Police would take public
drunks into protective custody and, instead of delivering them
to the county jail, would take such persons to an inebriate
center where they could be detained for 72 hours. During
this period the alcoholic could either voluntarily commit himself or an appropriate official could file an inebriacy petition
requiring further hospitalization. Hearings resulting from
such a petition would satisfy due process requirements. Counties would receive state aid to provide the essential facilities.
It is anticipated that considerable public monies would be
15. "Chronic Alcohol Addiction and
Criminal Responsibility; Logic in
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Search at Law," 7 A.C.L.Q. 2 at 16
(1968).
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would not be burdened

with the chronic alcohol offender .16
Illegal Use of Drugs by Non-addicted Persons
But what of the non-addicts who are found in possession
of illicit drugs or paraphernalia? Their conduct will never
be excused under any doctrine of criminal responsibility. 17
Only legalization of drugs can protect such persons and, with
one possible limited exception, this is politically unfeasible,
medically inadvisable and socially catastrophic.
Most drug arrests involve users under the age of 25 and
a large percentage of these (approximately 40 percent) are
under 18. 18 One writer estimates that approximately 30 percent of the 16 to 25 age group in California are violating the
drug laws. 19 If so, many of these young persons are either
getting arrested, in which case they must endure a criminal
record, or they are getting away with it, in which event disrespect for law is encouraged and the commission of second
and further offenses rendered more likely. The popular idea
16. The bill was introduced by Assemblyman Alan Sieroty, March 10,
1969, as reported in the San Francisco
Chronicle of the same date. The Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure proposes that each county establish inebriate reception centers staffed
by doctors and nurses to treat those
arrested for public intoxication. However, the proposal would give police
the option of jailing the offender.
The Chicago City Council is presently considering a pilot project for
detoxification treatment and rehabilitation of alcoholics. This would permit creation of a fifty-bed pilot unit
contiguous to the present alcoholic
treatment center which now primarily
treats volunteers. The new project
would be aimed at skid row derelicts.
In three police districts 53,000 drunks
were arrested in 1967 at a cost to the
city of $1,988,656. It is estimated that
it costs Chicago $37.50 to arrest and
process each drunk.

17. In a marijuana case, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
rejected equal protection, due process,
right to privacy, and cruel and unusual punishment arguments and affirmed a conviction for criminal possession. Commonwealth v. Leis, Mass - , 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
18. In 1967, there were 37,000
marijuana arrests in California. Over
14,000 of these were persons under the
age of 18. (In 1960 there were 1,616
arrests for all drugs including marijuana.) The median age for marijuana arrests was 20 in 1966, dropped
to 19 in 1967. (Drug Arrest Dispositions in California (1967) Bureau of
Criminal Statistics, Department of Justice, State of California.)
19. Kaplan; Foreword to Marijuana
Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15 D.C.L.A. L.R., pp.
1501-2 (1968).
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that only criminal types use marijuana is shattered by the fact
that in 1967 16,161 persons arrested for marijuana violations had no prior record. 20
Ironically, the very group society has set out to protect
through enactment of drug laws (but who nonetheless have
been victimized by the purveyors of illicit drugs) have become
the primary targets of the enforcement scheme. Given the
hypothesis upon which we justify harsh penalties for drug
sellers-that their conduct corrupts and destroys young people
-it is unjust, perhaps even cruel and unusual punishment in
the constitutional sense, to treat as felons the emotionally
susceptible and psychically vulnerable individuals who fall
prey to the seller. 1
Judicial dilemmas in the enforcement of drug abuse laws
are underlined by conflicting pressures-public opinion on the
one hand and sympathy for the accused on the other. Since
there are a large number of persons arrested for marijuana
offenses who have no prior criminal record, there is often a
desire on the part of prosecutors, and more frequently judges,
to ameliorate the harshness of the law. Frequently this is
accomplished by authorizing a misdemeanor plea. If this
does not occur, some judges will suffer through the felony
proceedings, straining to exercise a discretion that the law
does not provide, while others, believing in the wisdom of
our present marijuana laws, see the trial itself as an effective
deterrent. As Professor Kaplan suggests, "The preliminary
hearing and the trial will often reflect what the judge feels
about the marijuana laws and about the constitutional guarantees of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. And

20. Marijuana Laws: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15
V.C.L.A. L.R., pp. 1499, 1513; statistics obtained from California Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal
Statistics.
1. The Associated Press reported on
January 31, 1969, that two California
legislators, one a Democrat and the
other a Republican, are seeking ways of
648
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ameliorating drug laws, pointing out
that since penalties were increased in
1960, drug arrests were up 230 percent. (They continue to rise. Narcotics . arrests for the first six months
of 1968 were up 40 percent from the
same period in 1967.) The assemblymen seek new laws which will treat
drug violations as a public health
problem in order to attack the demand
as well as the supply.
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finally, at the sentencing level, there appear to be disparities
wider than those to which we are accustomed in the case of
other serious crimes and based in great part on the feeling
of the sentencing judge.,,2 Although the exercise of discretion is essential to the administration of justice, where drug
abuse laws are concerned, the broad use of discretion and
its many forms raise the spectrum of arbitrariness and unequal
enforcement of the law.
We are now confronted with an incredible situation in
which the enforcement of our drug laws hinders the rehabilitation of those apprehended in possession of drugs. Society deals
with these persons in an essentially punitive fashion, usually
ignoring the emotional problems which motivate their use of
drugs. If the drug user is convicted of a felony, he quickly
discovers that he is society'S outcast-unable to function
as an ordinary citizen, and finding refuge only in the further
use of drugs. If the drug fails to destroy the user, the law
can be counted upon to finish the job.
A Proposal

The penal sanctions of drug control legislation are intended
to penalize most heavily persons who profit from the drug
traffic. However, the bulk of those who feel the impact of
drug laws are users-not sellers-and the emphasis is clearly
misdirected. Whether society can safely exclude from the
criminal law the mere possession of drugs for personal use,
while continuing to impose heavy penalties upon traffickers,
is a policy question requiring careful consideration. As arrest
statistics indicate, many of those charged with drug possession
have no prior involvement with the law. This, in itself, suggests that a re-evaluation of the present legislative scheme
is in order. Insofar as the administration of criminal justice
is concerned, one thing seems clear: The possession of small
amounts of marijuana and other drugs should be prosecuted,
2. Marijuana Laws: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15

U.C.L.A. L.R., pp. 1499, 1505-1506
(1968).
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if at all, as a misdemeanor. 3 Most public criticism of the
manner in which we administer our drug laws stems from
the harsh penalties imposed upon those who possess drugs
for personal use. There is much to be said for the proposition
that, barring evidence of professionalism, that is, the regular
sale or possession for sale of drugs as a business venture,
all drug offenses should be treated as misdemeanors, thereby
relieving the criminal process, increasing pressure on sellers,
and permitting results more nearly approximating justice. 4
The principal objection to classifying as non-criminal the
possession of drugs for personal use, while continuing to prosecute sales, is that this might encourage drug use by eliminating the deterrent and in turn create a greater supply
and demand. Yet, to the extent that society utilizes the criminal sanction in the effort to control the drug use, the law can
and should be humanized and restructured so that offenses
which are essentially self-destructive may be so classified. This
would permit the victimless-self destructive act to be differentiated from behavior which possesses clearcut antisocial implications and serve to reduce the alienation of those who are
convicted of such offenses.
To accomplish this, I propose a reclassification of criminal
behavior into five divisions, the first three comprised of felonies
and misdemeanors, including most traditional common-law
crimes. The fourth and fifth divisions encompass victimless
and regulatory crime possessing limited anti-social characteristics.
3. New York treats possession of less
than 25 cigarettes or one-quarter ounce
of marijuana as a misdemeanor. Possession of less than one-eighth ounce
of heroin, cocaine or morphine is a
misdemeanor (New York Penal Law
§ 220.05).
4. A staff recommendation relating
to marijuana laws has been submitted
to the Advisory Board and staff of the
Penal Code Revision Project. Criminal sanctions for possession would result only when a defendant possesses
more than one pound of marijuana, in
650
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which event he would be guilty of a
misdemeanor. Possession of more than
ten pounds would be a felony. Anyone
smoking marijuana in a public place
would be guilty of a misdemeanor but
possession of one pound or less would
be non-criminal.
Marijuana would
continue to be an illegal drug but the
criminal process and the stigma of a
felony conviction would be mainly reserved for those who profit from its use
(Proposed Tentative Draft, Joint Legislative Committee for the Revision of
the Penal Code).
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Classification of Crime

I Crimes of violence (felony and misdemeanor).
II Crimes against property (felony and misdemeanor) .
III Non-violent crimes, not against property, but
threatening or affecting the substantial rights of
others (felony and misdemeanor).
IV Self-destructive crime (misdemeanor only).
V Miscellaneous petty offenses (infractions onlye.g., vehicular, fish and game, sanitary code,
etc.).
Classification IV, self-destructive crime, applies to the nonaddict drug possessor discussed herein and includes the possession of all drugs for personal use (whatever their character), paraphernalia, and public intoxication (alcohol or
any other drug). 5 The sale of drugs and possession with
intent to sell are within the ambit of classification III and
punishable as a felony. All class IV conduct (self-destructive crime) is denominated misdemeanor and punishable
by mandatory supervised probation of up to three years,
terminable earlier at the request of the probation officer
with court approval. Psychiatric evaluation and psychological testing would be required in all cases prior to sentencing. Confinement in the county jail is not contemplated
for a first offender unless there is a violation of probation. The
first offender could, however, be committed to a local facility
such as a halfway house, mental health center, inebriate
reception center, or county farm for a period of up to six
months. On a second offense, the court would be given an
option of sentencing a defendant to the county jail, in combination with the aforementioned facilities, if the court expressly
finds that under the circumstances of that case confinement in
the county jail would have therapeutic value. A third offense
(assuming the defendant is not an addict) would carry a man5. Prostitution, gambling and certain deviant non-aggressive sexual conduct also falls within this classification.
"Self-destructive" because such conduct
is most harmful to the offender-with

only collateral anti-social implications
in that it is disruptive of family relationships, causes indebtedness which
might inspire the commission of more
serious offenses, leads to addiction, etc.
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datory minimum thirty-day jail term. The probation officer is
given discretionary authority to temporarily parole a defendant
from any facility, including the jail, for out-patient treatment or
work furlough. If the defendant is an addict, then existing
commitment procedures to the California Rehabilitation Center or the State Hospital should be explored, indeed may be
required, if the prophecy of Robinson and Powell is fulfilled. 6
The legislative scheme I propose precludes a felony record
for the drug user, retains him in the community, and places
appropriate emphasis on prevention and rehabilitation. Moreover, society's interest in protecting the community against
widespread exposure to the uncontrolled use of drugs would
be promptly vindicated. 7

Conclusion
It is essential to place the problem of drug control in

perspective and to remember that it was never society's purpose
to punish as criminals those unfortunates who are caught up
in the horror of a drug habit. Thus, it is not surprising that
there is a significant segment of the public who seek, at the
very least, an amelioration of the criminal sanction so that
drug users will not be processed as felons-a result that ren6. The legislature, through incentive
legislation and appropriations, must assist the counties-acting jointly in the
case of the sparsely populated counties
and individually in the others to create
halfway houses and county farms where
none exist and to expand existing community mental health centers with inpatient facilities.
7. On March 16, 1969, after this
paper was written and in process of
editing for publication, the Associated
Press reported that Assemblyman Alan
Sieroty had proposed legislation making
possession of marijuana for personal
use a misdemeanor in all cases, punishable by a maximum of 90 days in the
county jail. The bill would repeal the
law that requires registration of one
convicted of marijuana possession and
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the law which makes it a crime to be
present where marijuana is being used.
Possession for sale under the Sieroty
bill would continue to be a felony.
The wire service quotes Assemblyman
Sieroty as saying "it is clear that marijuana is not a narcotic, is not addictive,
produces no physical dependence or
withdrawal symptoms, and its users do
not require increased dosages over a
period of time." Sieroty takes note of
the large number of young persons
who use marijuana, thereby ignoring
the severe penalties attached to it. He
suggests that "these laws are alienating
many young people and causing them
to have disrespect for the law-much
as prohibition laws did a generation
ago."
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effective rehabilitation virtually impossible and hopelessly overburdens the criminal process.
Currently, society is focusing on marijuana. Considering
the lack of evidence that marijuana is addictive or has a
physically debilitating effect, and the abundant evidence that
it is non-addictive and only mildly intoxicating, it is not surprising that legislatures throughout the nation are debating the
wisdom of substantially reducing penalties for possession or
punishing only illicit traffic in the drug. s
There is logic and justice in such an approach. Alcohol has
been positively identified as a causal factor in the commission
of violent crime, particularly homicide, and plays a major role
in over 50 percent of our criminal statistics. Yet, the use of
alcohol goes virtually unregulated except insofar as the law
attempts to penalize conduct flowing from its excessive use
8. Only one truly scientific study of
marijuana effects has been conducted
in the United States. This was completed in 1948 in the Behavioral
Pharmacological Laboratory of the
Boston University School of Medicine
sponsored and prepared by its Division
of Psychiatry and the Boston University Medical Center. The researchers
used two groups of human subjects, one
comprised of chronic users and another
made up of persons who had not previously tried marijuana. The experiments were well-controlled with the
amount of dosage concealed from the
subjects and placebos used interchangeably with marijuana. Five acute nicotine reactions were observed that were
far more spectacular than effects produced by marijuana smoking-including the higher dosages. Most subjects,
including the "un initiates" thought the
high dose was a low dose, thereby "emphasizing the unimpressiveness of their
subjective reactions." There is evidence of "reverse tolerance," that is,
smaller amounts are needed to produce a euphoric effect as use becomes
more frequent.
With many drugs
(such as alcohol) there is a need for in-

creasing doses to achieve the same effect. The study concludes in part that
"in a neutral setting persons who are
naive to marijuana do not have strong
subjective experiences after smoking
low or high doses of the drug, and the
effects they do report are not the same
as those described by regular users
of marijuana who take the drug in the
same neutral setting; marijuana-naive
persons do demonstrate impaired performance on simple intellectual and
psychomotor tests after smoking marijuana, the impairment is dose-related in
some cases, regular users of marijuana
do get high after smoking marijuana in
a neutral setting but do not show the
same degree of impairment of performance on the tests as do naive subjects.
In some cases, their performance even
appears to improve slightly after smoking marijuana; in a neutral setting the
psychological and physiological effects
of a single, inhaled dose of marijuana
appear to reach maximum intensity
within one-half hour of inhalation, to
be diminished after one hour, and to be
completely dissipated by three hours."
(Reported in Vol. 162, Science Magazine, pp. 1234-1242).
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while marijuana possession, with no demonstrable connection
to violent crime, is frequently processed as a felony.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice reports: "On the basis of the present
data, one can say that there is a strong link between alcohol
and homicide and that the presumption is that alcohol plays
a causal role as one of the necessary and precipitating elements
for violence. Such a role is in keeping with the most probable
effects of alcohol as a depressant of inhibition control centers
in the brain-leading to release of impulses."9 The F.B.I.'s
Uniform Crime Statistics consistently report that well over
50 percent of all arrests in the United States are for alcoholrelated offenses, such as public drunk, liquor law violations,
and drunk driving, or for offenses which involve drinking,
such as disorderly conduct and vagrancy. The President's
commission asserts that the burden on the police in connection
with alcohol-related problems is even greater than the statistics
reveal because many cases involving drunks are handled without an arrest and therefore are not reflected in the statistics. 10
In view of the above statistics linking alcohol to the commission of crime, it is difficult to justify the present approach
to marijuana enforcement, particularly considering the debilitating and habituating effect of alcohol on the individual
drinker as opposed to the lack of such evidence with respect
to the marijuana user.
We are witnessing a social phenomenon that Professor
Sanford Kadish refers to as "the crisis of over-criminalization,"ll in which the state seeks to enforce standards of private
morality as if the public welfare required it. The basic premise
upon which such laws are based should be reexamined in order
that the energies of law enforcement will not be diverted from

9. Mind Altering Drugs and Dangerous Drugs: Alcohol, U.S. Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Drunkenness, Washington D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, pp.
40-41 (1967); in 64 per cent of the
homicide cases, alcohol was a factor,
and in the majority of these cases alco654
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hoi was present in both parties to the
crime.
10. U.S. Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report, pp. 8-9.

11. See Annals of American Academy of Political Science, Nov. 1967, p.
157.
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criminal conduct constituting an imminent threat to life, property, and the right
to live in peace and security.12
Meanwhile, decency and the United States Constitution require that we not jail the sick for disease-compelled conduct.
If confinement is required for the protection of society then
these persons should be committed in accord with the requirements of due process and appropriate institutions must be provided for this purpose. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring
opinion in Robinson wrote that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, "expresses the revulsion of civilized man against barbarous acts-the 'cry of
horror' against man's inhumanity to his fellow man.
We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment,"
he wrote, "if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age
of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action."13
Much of the unrest among today's youth stems from the
hypocrisy inherent in certain of our laws and procedures.
Originally designed to facilitate the administration of justice,
our Penal Code cries out for revision; for a reformation, not
a rearrangement. 14 Some critics say, "scrap the system," and

12. Baltimore, Maryland's, prosecutor, Charles E. Moylin, Jr., told a
Criminal Law Briefing Conference
sponsored by the Federal Bar Association and Bureau of National Affairs
that there is a peculiarly American
habit of over-criminalization and that
this places an intolerable burden on the
courts and brings the criminal law into
disrepute. He subdivides the crime
problem into eight "crime waves."
With respect to drug usage, he asks to
what extent we want the law to protect people from themselves by curtailing their indulgence in drugs. He refers to "victimless crime," an example
of which is gambling. He says that
dockets are severely overburdened by
the regulation of private morals. The
worst "crime wave" he theorizes, involves petty offenses. He states that
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its cause is not the breakdown of law
and order "but too much law enforcement." It involves the enforcement of
local municipal regulations and punishment in conjunction with the criminal
process of the most minor transgressions in the fields of sanitation, carpentry, professional practitioners, licensing, hunting and fishing, peddling,
animal husbandry, etc. "It would be
an Orwellian nightmare," he says, "if
we had not slowly acclimated ourselves to it." Moylin suggests that we
"rethink the fundamentals" (4 Criminal
Law Reporter 2445, 2456, March 5,
1969) .
13. 370 U.S. at 676-678, 8 L.Ed.2d
at 768-769, 82 S.Ct. at 1425, concurring opinion of Justice Douglas.

14. The scope of the revision projCAL LAW 1969
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many of these are willing to resort to violence to achieve that
end. We had better listen, reexamine, and, where indicated,
reform those areas of law and procedure that have outlived
their usefulness. Drug control is one of them. The fundamental objective remains: justice. The appellate courts have
endeavored to ameliorate the harshness of unjust laws, when
the legislature, for one reason or another, has refused to listen
and to act. But the power of the courts to innovate, even
when they are so inclined, is limited, and, when exercised, subjects the judiciary to criticism that tends to undermine respect
for law. Legislators throughout the nation had best respond to
the challenge while it remains within their grasp to do so,
keeping in mind the admonition of Francis Bacon that "he
who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for
time is the greatest innovator."

ect in California is uncertain but there
is in existence a Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code,
chaired by Senator Donald Grunsky.
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